simply follow deliberation ("cut it off"), but also affect the formation of a deliberative rational agreement (1996: 304ff.) . Still, Habermas is quite clear that " [p] olitical deliberations…must be concluded by majority decision in view of the pressures to decide" (1996: 306).
It is not a puzzle that, because of the practical requirements of politics, we cannot wait for consensus to emerge and so must vote. What is, I think, puzzling, is that deliberative democrats, seeing that actual consensus is an impossible goal, suppose that the majority rule procedures are the best way to cope with the demands of practical politics. If the regulative ideal is agreement among N citizens, why should it be the case that the preferred institutional approximation is that measures are adopted if and only if they are supported by more than N/2 voters?
In this essay I argue that majority rule is most unlikely to be the procedure that would be justified through an appeal to public reason: there is a strong case that the optimal deliberative democratic voting rules require extraordinary majorities. And because of that, I shall argue, deliberative democracy is severely limited as a political theory about how actual disputes are to be resolved under modern conditions of deep disagreement. Sections 2 and 3 consider important preliminary matters concerning how voting and public reason are best conceptualized. Although we often refer to "deliberative democracy" as if it is a single view, there are many accounts of deliberative democracy (Dryzek, 2004) . We need to be careful about just what form of deliberative democracy we have in mind. Section 2 examines three competing views of public reason and deliberation while Section 3 distinguishes two ways that voting can seen as expressing public reason. Sections 4 and 5 then advance the main argument of the paper: drawing on the classic work of James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock (1962) , I argue that, given the preferred understandings of public reason and voting, the best voting rule for deliberative democracy is a supermajority rule. In Section 6 I argue that this result shows that deliberative democracy is often ill-equipped to provide guidance as to how actual political disputes are to be legitimately resolved. As a political theory of actual political choice, I shall argue, deliberative democracy will often be indeterminate: it provides no guidance about what we should do, just when we most need it.
What is the Relation between Public Deliberation
and a Publicly Justified Outcome?
2.1
The aim of deliberative democrats is to reason together so as to arrive at publicly justified shared moral norms, political laws, and public policies. 1 Let us call the outcome of appropriate public deliberation on issue I the publicly justified position, or the publicly correct position, on I. Theories of deliberative democracy differ in how they relate appropriate public deliberation to the publicly correct answer. We can distinguish at least three different accounts; let us begin with
Collaborative Reasoning: 2 A deliberation D is collaborative only if (i) D is about some issue I for which there is a deliberation-independent criterion of a correctness (e.g., justified true belief regarding I); (ii) participants to D about I are more likely to arrive at this correct outcome than are individuals who do not participate in D; and (iii)
that a large proportion of the participants disagree about the publicly correct answer regarding I is a strong reason to question anyone's claim to have reached the publicly correct answer regarding I.
In collaborative reasoning we reason together about some matter in a way that makes it more likely that we arrive at the publicly correct view. Not all sound reasoning is collaborative. While it might reasonably be argued that good reasoning qua presenting arguments and replying to objections is inherently collaborative in the sense of (i) and
(ii), claim (iii) is an additional and stronger claim. According to (iii), if after engaging in deliberation on I, the participants still disagree, then every participant has strong reason to doubt his or her own view. Clause (iii) points to a conviction that, on this matter, reasoners really ought to come to the same conclusion, and something has gone wrong when they do not. I take it that Rawls denies that reasoning about conceptions of the good is collaborative in this sense; competing credible or reasonable conclusions about conceptions of the good are "the natural outcome of the activities of human reason under free enduring institutions" (1996: xxvi). In contrast, Rawls does think that deliberation about matters of justice ought to tend towards consensus, at least among reasonable people. This is important. Any account of collaborative reasoning will have to identify a class of competent participants in the deliberation, whose dissent is relevant to (iii).
Reasoning in a scientific community is, at least on most accounts, collaborative.
Persistent disagreement within a group of competent inquirers about I is an indication that something is amiss: none of the positions are sufficiently well-justified to claim the truth, insofar as the deliberation about I has not reached its conclusions. Recall here C.
S. Peirce's notion that truth is that which a diligent community of inquirers would come to agree on (Misak: 2000) . That some competent members of the community disagree is an indication that deliberation has not yet reached its successful conclusion. One of the 5 revolutionary features of Thomas Kuhn's (1970) analysis of science was precisely to deny that scientific inquiry was collaborative in this sense; only within a shared paradigm, Kuhn maintains, does scientific inquiry have this collaborative character.
2.2
That science is typically understood as an instance of collaborative reasoning suggests that it is not a sufficiently strong sense of public reasoning to ground deliberative democracy. Some, perhaps, conceive of deliberative democracy as akin to scientific inquiry-for example, those who see it as an epistemic procedure seeking to uncover objective truths about morality (e.g., Estlund, 1997 her present position, a public constructivism may maintain that the relevant set is all citizens considered as reasonable or rational. Rawls takes this route, excluding unreasonable beliefs and judgments from the set of individual judgments on which the public constructivist function (f) operates (1996: 53-54). As Rawls sees it, a slave-owning class which insists that the two principles of justice do not express public reasonbecause the slave owners reject them in favor of a system allowing property rights in other people-is unreasonable. "We say: 'Their proposal was perfectly rational given their strong bargaining position, but it was nevertheless highly unreasonable, even outrageous'" (Rawls, 1996: 48) . For our purposes, the important point is that such constructivist theories understand public reason as an expression of shared judgments under some idealized condition, e.g., assuming individuals are rational or reasonable, and are addressing considerations to others. Let, then, {b 1 ...b n } be the belief systems of suitably idealized reasonable persons 1 through N on matter I; the basic idea of public constructivism is that there is function f such that f{b 1 ...b n } 6 α means that α is the correct public position about I. That is, the public constructivism function operates on the set of suitably constrained individual beliefs to yields the publicly correct position in
I.
2.3 A public constructivism must somehow take into account every idealized person's beliefs, values, reasons, etc., and construct public reason out of it. The most obvious candidate is a consensus justification; on a consensus justification, α is publicly justified if each suitably idealized member of the public holds α. Consensus justification is at the heart of Rawls's political constructivism, which seeks a free-standing view built on shared "fundamental ideas that are drawn from the public political culture of a democratic society" (Rawls, 1996: 25n) . A justification, however, can also be by convergence (D'Agostino, 1996: 30-31 Collaborative conceptions of deliberative democracy, then, will see voting as evidentiary of public reason. That a vote has taken place and α has won is, on this view, evidence that α is the deliberation-independent correct view of the matter. On this view, then, deliberation is a way to enhance the inputs into the voting procedure. Since deliberation tends to produce agreement on the correct view of the matter, votes taken after deliberation have a higher evidentiary value.
3.2
Deliberative constructivist accounts of public reason are apt to be confused with views that conceive of public reason as constructed through voting. Some followers of Rousseau-or, at least, some interpretations of Rousseau-have made a similar error.
Rousseau certainly had a constructive account of the general will: the general will was formed from set of individual wills, suitably idealized (Gaus, 1997) . Rousseau describes the general will as the will of the people. He also, though, insists that if the people deliberate under the proper conditions, their decision will reveal the general will (Rousseau, 1997 (Rousseau, [1762 : 59-60). But, of course, Rousseau also held that voting reveals the general will. William Riker (1988: 11) interprets Rousseau thus:
The fundamental notion goes at least back to Rousseau. There is a social contract, which creates a "moral and collective body" that has "life" and "will," that is, the famous "general will," the will of the incorporated people, the Sovereign....The way to discover the general will....is to compute it by consulting the citizens.
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into an overall social choice. And so it makes no sense to claim that voting constitutes the popular will. Social choice theory effectively undermines any claim that voting constitutes a uniquely correct way to amalgamate individual preferences. 5 But deliberative constructivist accounts of public reason do not accord this role to voting:
because it is deliberation that constructs public reason, it cannot also be voting that does so. Unless it just so happened that the construction of public reason through voting was equivalent with the construction through deliberation, these are inconsistent ways of constructing public reason. Therefore, like the collaborative conception of public reason, the deliberative constructivist view must take voting as evidentiary of public reason.
What, then, is the aim of voting for a deliberative constructivist? What is it evidence
of? One obvious proposal is that the perfect voting procedure would give us a totally reliable answer as to whether some law L accords with public reason on matter I.
However, there is strong reason for a deliberative democrat to reject this idea. To say that the application of the ideal voting rule would, with total reliability, yield the correct judgment as to whether L accords with public reason on I is to say that the voting rule is a perfect indicator of whether L conforms to D*, the idealized deliberation. This, though, would be to transform our constructivist account into a collaborative conception, for it seeks voting rules that reveal a D-independent criterion of correctness. To put it bluntly: Because of this, it would be exceedingly difficult-really impossible-to predict where this process will lead. Suppose we take a vote at time t; participants not only have to know the state of their deliberations about I at t, but be good predictors of what paths deliberation will follow after t, so that they could predict the ultimate projected end of the deliberations. Because such estimates are terribly hard to make, the deliberative constructivist stresses the need for actual discourse; it is the actual path D takes that (at least partly) determines the publicly correct position on I. this cannot be known, the best voting procedure for which the constructivist deliberative democrat can reasonably hope would be one according to which, if a vote is taken at time t, L will pass if and only if it has been quasi-vindicated at t. To ask more-that it predicts whether at the end of the deliberation L will be finally vindicated-is to ask that the voting procedure outpaces actual deliberation. analysis of the market, each participant has extensive personal and local knowledge, but no one has comprehensive knowledge of the state of the total system (see Hayek, 1991; Barnett, 1998: 30-35 Figure 1 below gives three prima facie plausible relations.
4.2
According to Curve A, the "tendency to avoid oppression" (that is, the tendency to avoid false positives) is very high when over 50 percent of the voters endorse L. been quasi-vindicated, a simple majority rule with ten thousand voters would select L only if it was quasi-vindicated with over a ninety-nine percent reliability (Kuflik, 1997: 306) . This would yield a curve that is essentially flat at the top end.
This line of reasoning may well be relevant to a collaborative conception of public reason.
7 It will be recalled that, according to collaborative accounts, the point of public reasoning is to arrive at a deliberation-independent conception of correctness ( §2.1).
Condorcet's jury theorem seeks to show that majority rule is a highly efficient way to arrive at shared true judgments. 8 To be sure, the literature is filled with doubts about the relevance of Condorcet-type reasoning for democracy; I shall not seek to pursue these doubts here (see Gaus, 1997 , but also Goodin and Estlund, 2004 (Think of the law of large numbers: once one has an adequate sample from a large pool, there is little information to be gained by continued sampling.) If all voters had essentially the same information, this would be a plausible conjecture, as the voters at the top end would be essentially in surplus, and so largely unnecessary, observations. However, our societies are characterized by a rich plurality of values and experiences.
Each individual is apt to bring new information to bear on the deliberation and decision.
It might appear that curve A can be defended if we reinterpret what voters are up to.
Rather than each deciding on his personal (and local) knowledge of the actual deliberation to which he has been party, we might revert to the interpretation according to which each seeks to answer the same comprehensive question: "Overall, has L been quasi-vindicated in D?" ( §3.4). Two objections confront such a proposal. First, although this interpretation may perhaps help alleviate the burden of each appealing to his own personal knowledge, we still have severe problems of different local knowledge: given the segmented nature of the information, even if each was seeking to answer the same question, each would be doing so on different informational bases. Secondly, and more importantly, if each is really trying to answer this global question-summing up not simply his experiences but an overall comprehensive judgment about the current state of D-then the reliability of each of these judgments is apt to be extremely low. Again, Hayekian-like considerations would lead us to doubt whether votes can make accurate estimates of the global state of knowledge. Given this, the Condorcet jury theorem, which prima facie seems to endorse curves shaped like A, would actually support curves that move in the opposite direction of A. As is well known, if the average competency of each voter is less than 50 percent, Condorcet reasoning shows that reliability plunges downwards as votes are aggregated, just as dramatically as aggregation produces as upward sweep in reliability when average voter reliability is above 50 percent.
4.3
Curve B, positing a simple linear relation between degree of support and tendency to avoid oppression, does not make the mistake of A in overly discounting the information of those at the top end of the curve. Its error, which it shares with A, is that it places far too much weight on low levels of support for L as an indicator that L might be quasivindicated (and so not oppressive). For L to be quasi-vindicated, it must be the case that has not been vindicated in D. They both avoid oppressive laws. However, avoiding false positives is not the only aim of a deliberative democratic voting rule. The drawback to N is that it tends to too many false negatives-it tends to eliminate proposals that have been quasi-vindicated because erroneous voters (especially, but not only, the m group) reject them. We not only wish to avoid oppression: we want a society that lives according to shared, public, norms. As we increase the number of voters required to pass a measure, we run increased risk of missing out on shared norms verified by public reason: we miss opportunities for a shared moral life. "Malfunctioning" voters can veto a measure that normatively sound voters-those who conform to the proper norms of discourse, weighing reasons and so on-would endorse. Thus laws that truly have been quasivindicated by D (our actual deliberations) might be often rejected by an N rule. The attraction of a k rule is that it cuts down on false negatives vis a vis N while doing as well, or nearly as well, avoiding false positives.
However, even the k rule will generate false negatives. Even voters who do not malfunction according to the rules of discourse or epistemic standards of deliberating on reasons can give an erroneous judgment. It would be wrong to identify the class on nonmalfunctioning voters with those who have made no errors. One can have a fully justified, yet erroneous belief (see Gaus, 1996: 39) . Consequently, while under a k rule a vote of k-1 would defeat L, it is certainly still possible that L was in fact quasi-vindicated in D, and so the rule generated a false negative. False negatives, then, are a cost of a deliberative democratic voting rule that must be considered when seeking to identify the optimal rule. 23 5.2 A decision on the optimal voting rule, then, must also take into account the costs of the voting rule in terms of its tendency to eliminate quasi-vindicated proposals. Figure 3 advances three estimates of the benefits of voting rules in avoiding false negatives as the percentage of votes required for passage rises.
High
Again we have three possible relations between the number of voters required to pass L and the tendency of the voting system to satisfy the desideratum. Curve A depicts a simple linear relation. If only 1 person is required to pass a piece of legislation, it will, of course, be extremely easy for legislation to pass; consequently, the probability that a truly quasi-vindicated L will erroneously be rejected by the voting system approaches zero. So a one person rule would highly satisfy our second desideratum: it would not miss opportunities for the moral life. At the other extreme, a unanimity rule-requiring everyone's assent before L is passed -would do badly on this score: it would have a high tendency to eliminate quasi-vindicated rules and so undermine the possibility for a moral life. But while curve A gets the extremes right, its supposition of a simple linear relation is implausible. The probability that L really is quasi-vindicated in cases where it is supported by only a small minority of voters seems negligible. It certainly would not be the case that, say, a rule that required only 20 percent to approve of L would do much worse than the one person rule in satisfying this second desideratum: in neither case do we expect it is likely that all competent reasoners vindicate L but the vast majority of voters do not realize this, and vote against it. 9 The real possibility of false negatives does not arise until a rule requires for passage that L is supported by a high percentage of votes cast. As we approach decision rules that require large extraordinary majorities, we would expect the benefits of avoiding false negatives to steeply decrease, up to the point in which they are extremely low with the N rule, which rules out proposals vetoed by any one voter.
5.3
Curve B holds that the tendency to satisfy the second desideratum decreases rather quickly after majority rule. The shape of B is certainly more plausible that A, but again, its postulated relation seems dubious. Remember, a law is quasi-vindicated at a certain point in the deliberation only if no competent deliberator has uncovered decisive objections to it; and we are assuming that the large majority of citizens are competent. If so, the supposition that say, 40% of the citizens are very likely to disapprove of L even when it is quasi-vindicated seems remote. Remember, if even a single competent deliberator has decisive objections to L, it is not quasi-vindicated, and so eliminating L
25
would not be to lose an opportunity to live a shared moral life. Only as the number of voters approaches the number of fully competent citizens do we run high risks of erroneously eliminating quasi-vindicated laws; even normatively competent deliberators can make mistakes. If the number required for passage is the entire set of normatively competitive reasoners, the risk of false negatives begins to loom large. If we require the approval of more than the set of competent reasoners (on our supposition, if we go beyond a k rule and require support of some of the m voters), the risk of false negatives quickly increases, since these voters are far more apt than the competent voters to register erroneous objections. Curve C thus seems to depict the correct general relation between number of voters and the tendency to satisfy the second desideratum: a slow decrease in the tendency from 1 to near k, and then a sudden decrease after that.
5.4
We can now combine desiderata-satisfying functions as in Figure 4 : Low against some alternatives; if x votes are enough to approve alternative A, x votes must be enough to approve of alternative B. Famously, supermajority rules often do not meet this condition. Assuming that j>N/2+1 (the j voting rule is a supermajority rule), we can easily see how it can take j votes to pass L but less than j voters to defeat L. It is thus easier to defeat L, and maintain the status quo, than it is to legislate a change. Thus supermajorities are said to be conservative rules biased toward the status quo. Given that deliberative democrats are typically not conservatives who accord a special status to the status quo, they might thus seem to have a principled objection to supermajority rules. This, no doubt, is one ground for their otherwise puzzling support for majority rule ( §1).
We need to pause here and reflect on what we mean by a "bias" towards the status quo. In the context of deliberative democracy it would seem that the most plausible interpretation of the claim that a voting rule is biased in favor of the status quo is that by employing it we shall miss too many opportunities to live a shared moral life. By making it difficult to move away from the current set of laws, a supermajority rule might be too prone to block moves to adopt a law that genuinely satisfies the norms of public reason.
That surely would be a great cost to insisting on a supermajority rule. However, we have already taken that cost into account: the second desideratum is all about minimizing such lost opportunities. Of course if the only thing we are concerned with is minimizing the missed opportunities for a shared moral life, a simple majority rule is attractive (though a less than simple majority rule such as plurality does even better). But we also must concern ourselves with minimizing the tendency for laws to be oppressive, and simple majority rules do not do well on that score. The power of the case for the 28 supermajority rule is that it unites both desiderata: we have seen that under plausible assumptions a k rule optimally combines the dual goals of avoiding oppression and not missing opportunities for a shared moral life. Thus the case is not conservative insofar as this means privileging one sort of mistake (an erroneous change) over another (an erroneous failure to change).
6.2
Not all supermajority rules violate neutrality. Robert E. Goodin and Christian List (2006) point out that supermajority rules may be either asymmetrical or symmetrical. An asymmetrical rule violates neutrality requiring, for example, that more votes are needed to change the current law than to retain it: that j is required to enact, but less than j is required to keep the status quo. If supermajority rules are to be determinate-always giving a result-then they must be asymmetrical, and so non-neutral. This is not a problem for what we might call "liberal democracy." As I have argued elsewhere, liberal political theory is built on a presumption in favor of non-interference and non-coercion (Gaus, 1996: 162-166) . As J.S. Mill put it, "the onus of making a case always lies on the defenders of legal prohibitions" (1963a: 938): "in practical matters, the burthen of proof is supposed to be with those who are against liberty " (1963b: 262 proposal that N-j also think is unjust (the members of these two groups need not be identical). Surely it does not have to be that case that one or the other is just, or that one or the other must be in accord with public reason. Nor does it even have to be determinate that one or the other is better from the perspective of public reason: we cannot know until the deliberation has proceeded. When confronted with a choice of two options, neither of which recommends itself to public reason, it is by no means necessary that public reason itself demands that one must be chosen or that one is superior.
6.3
But, the deliberative democrat may respond, we must do something, and whichever option receives the most votes is, at least very slightly, more likely to be quasi-vindicated than that which receives less votes. Majority rule might be the worst method-except for the alternatives. It is certainly true that, given Figure 4 , majority rules fare better than below 50% rules in terms of the combined benefits. So, given the demands of action, it may seem, the best course is a majority vote. There are, though, two reasons for a deliberative democrat not to embrace this reply.
First, although according to Figure 4 the combined benefits of a proposal with 51 percent of the vote exceed that with 49 percent, not only are the combined benefits much lower than for supermajority rules, but the risk of oppression is high-most of the benefits are in terms of avoiding missed opportunities for the moral life, and relatively little comes from the tendency to avoid oppression. To urge a voting rule that, in the interest of political determinacy leaves a polity open to oppression seems ill-advised.
Given the deep moral commitments of deliberative democracy, this compromise with political reality comes at a high cost indeed.
Second, as Habermas (1996: 307) stresses, there is an internal connection between public deliberation and procedures: the nature of the procedures affect the process of public deliberation. Majoritarian rules, which regularly validate proposals that are unlikely to have been quasi-validated by public reason are to that extent are corrupting: they induce a politics in which "winning the game" does not support the search for quasivindicated proposals.
Conlcusion: Deliberative Democracy, Political Action and the Burdens of Justification

7.1
The deliberative democrat appears caught in a dilemma. On the one hand, there is a strong case for super-majority voting rules, and this case is not objectionably conservative. But given this case, if the deliberative democrat constructs a voting system that adequately tracks public reason, the outcome will often be indeterminate. And this seems to mean that just when we most need a legitimate way to resolve political 32 differences-when we are really divided about the right common course and so are in what Jeremy Waldron (1999: 102) calls "the circumstances of politics"-deliberative democracy is apt to be of little help. Neither L nor not-L will be endorsed by its rules. If we decide, we must decide without relying on the ideal of deliberative democracy.
Confronted by this unattractive position, we can understand deliberative democrats embracing majority rule as way "to cut off deliberation" and "make a decision." Thus our initial puzzle ( §1) has an answer: embracing majority rule seeks to make deliberative democracy politically relevant in the real world of politics, where intractable disagreement is the norm. But this raises the other horn of the dilemma. The cost of political relevance is often embracing oppression: simple majority rule is likely to endorse laws that have been decisively defeated in our actual deliberations.
7.2
As I have argued (Gaus, 2007a) elsewhere in a different context and a different way, deliberative democracy, as a theory of political legitimacy of laws and policies, wilts under what we might call the "burdens of justification." Under modern conditions of reasonable pluralism, the deliberative democrat seeks to collectively justify laws and policies through direct appeal to deliberation and the actual exercise of public reason: what all deliberators rationally endorse. But such public reason is an extremely demanding standard-it does not allow us to dismiss small, normatively competent, actual minorities as unimportant in the face of majoritarian demands. Because of this, if we are to stay true to the deliberative democrat's ideal of public reason in its application to actual politics, we must employ demanding voting rules. But as soon as we do so, we see that shouldering these heavy burdens of justification often renders the theory indeterminate,
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and so of far less practical relevance than it aspires. Whether other accounts of public reason can better bear the burdens of justification is not my concern here (see Gaus, 2007) . And I have only considered one version of deliberative democracy-perhaps other versions do not have these difficulties. I think it is clear, though, that an important version of deliberative democracy-deliberative constructivism-has great difficulty both shouldering its justificatory burdens and making itself relevant to the urgencies of political life.
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curves that only concern the second half of the curves I discuss here. It still can be shown that supermajority rules or unanimity rules are optimal under a variety of conditions (Dougherty and Edwards, 2004) . To keep the analysis simple, and to show how majority rule fares on our desiderata vis a vis less-than-majority rules, I employ continuous curves here. The costs of contradictory laws, though of course important, is not crucial to our main concerns. If the reader is worried by contradictory laws for decision rules of less that 50%, assume the curves all begin at majority rule. It should be pointed out, though, that when we have choices over three options, rules that require less than 50% need not lead to chaotic results (e.g., plurality). My comments in the text concerning Condorcet's jury theorem apply to Goodin's analysis as well-differing local knowledge is even more of a problem for Goodin's analysis.
